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space-system architects and researchers to investigate 
Abstract-We compare two scrubbing mitigation schemes for alternative approaches to design. Although it is well 
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discussed along with an examination of mitigation limitations. susceptible to upsets, one aspect of this investigation is to 
Proton and Heavy Ion data are then presented and analyzed. determine how to fully take advantage of cutting-edge 
commercial FPGA devices while adhering to the rigid 
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constraints of flight projects. 
HE Advancement of commercial CMOS technology has 
Ta f fo rded  the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) 
community a considerable increase in functional complexity 
and implementation options. Commercial FPGAs have 
become more efficient requiring less power with higher 
electrical performance than predecessors. Unfortunately, due 
to the reduction in core voltage, decrease in transistor 
geometry, and increase in switching speeds, commercial 
CMOS transistors have become more susceptible to incurring 
faults. 
Because of the harsh environment of space and its effects on 
electronic devices, the aerospace community has traditionally 
followed a rigidlconservative design methodology. Selected 
devices targeted for flight (referred to as SEU-hardened) are 
generally made for optimal operation in mild to harsh radiation 
environ&ents. SEU-Hardened FPGAs have configuration 
error cross-sections close to 0 even in worse case conditions. 
State of the Art, Rad-Hard FPGA logic error cross-sections are 
typically, between 1 e-08cm2/flip-flop to 1 eSo7 cm2/flip-flop 
under worst case. Unfortunately, current rad-hard FPGA parts 
have become very expensive and leave no room for mistakes 
or changes (one time programmable devices). This has lead 
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One category of commercial devices that is being given a 
considerable amount of attention is reprogrammable SRAM 
based FPGAs. Xilinx (Virtex 11, Virtex 4, and Virtex 5) 
SRAM-based FPGAs are the forerunners for aerospace 
research. This type of device can be reprogrammed because 
its configuration is stored in SRAM (vs. fixed configuration 
types such as anti-fuses). The implementation pros are speed 
and agility. However, a caveat is that the configuration 
memory is not radiation-hardened and is susceptible to faults. 
It is also important to note that SRAM-based FPGAs not only 
incur upsets in configuration but also incur upsets in their 
functional logic paths. 
Proposed mitigation techniques for configuration vs. 
functional logic are very different and are not easy to 
implement. The purpose of configuration mitigation is to 
protect the FPGA configuration from upsets. This approach 
requires the system to have the ability to write into the 
configuration memory space with correct configuration data 
and can be categorized as follows: 
Category 1 Reconfiguration: Apply a full reconfiguration to 
the FPGA (every so often or upon detection of error state). 
This requires that the system operation will come to a stop. 
Returning back to the previous state of operation can only be 
accomplished by having redundant circuitry (or extra- 
knowledge). 
Category 2 Scrubbing: Write over portions of the 
configuration memory that do not disrupt operation. The 
system is fully operational. The caveat is that some portions of 
configuration memory and interface controls are not able to be 
written ("scrubbed") and are therefore still susceptible to 
upsets. Upon faults to inaccessible configuration space that 
cause Single Event Functional Interrupts (SEFIs), the system 
will have to come down and a category 1 reconfiguration will 
have to be performed. 
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This paper will focus on category 2 (scrubbing) configuration- 
upset mitigation schemes. A comparison of performance and 
error cross-sections between a self-contained category 2 
scrubber developed by Xilinx [4] vs. an external category 2 
scrubber developed by the NASNGSFC Radiation Effects and 
Analysis Group is presented. 
11. TRADE-OFF: COMPLEXITY VS. FLEXIBILITY 
The major concern of implementing designs targeted for space 
within SRAM-based FPGAs is how to mitigate and protect 
against an increased probability of faults. For flight critical 
designs, the aerospace industry is conservative and uses 
hardened devices. However, for non-critical portions of a 
mission (such as data capture or processing information that 
can be recaptured or lossy), the aerospace industry is 
investigating the utilization of devices that provide increased 
flexibility. The ability to reprogram a function while in-flight 
is of great advantage to many missions, therefore projects are 
now considering the tradeoff between an increase of 
complexity for an increase in flexibility. 
We show in this paper that for most missions it will be 
mandatory to apply configuration mitigation if implementing a 
SRAM-based FPGA design. We concentrate on three modes 
of category-two mitigation: 
(1) No scrubbing 
(2) Internal Scrubbing (Xilinx proprietary) 
(3) External Scrubbing 
111. SELF-CONTAINED XILINX SCRUBBER - SEU CONTROLLER 
BLOCK 
A. General Description 
The hardware for the SEU Controller block is comprised of 
several sub-modules as illustrated in Figure 1. Configuration 
memory is accessed through the Internal Configuration Access 
Port (ICAP). This port cannot be accessed by any other device 
but Xilinx internal circuitry. The Frame ECC block is 
responsible for error detection and correction. It uses a 
hamming code Single Error Correct and Double Error Detect 
(SECDED) scheme [4]. 
B. SEU Correction Operational Flow 
The configuration memory space is divided into frames 
containing a corresponding parity syndrome. Once the SEU 
controller commences operation, frames are read one at a time 
and a SECDED ECC is performed [4]. If a single error within 
a frame is detected, the SEU DETECT (Figure 1) flag will go 
high, after the correction is calculated and the corrected frame 
is written into configuration memory, the SEU DETECT will 
go low. If there is a double bit error the ECC circuitry will 
raise the SCAN ERROR Flag (see Figure 1). 
C. SEU Correction and Detection- Validation. 
It is important to emphasize that the Xilinx SEU Controller 
can only correct one bit within a frame. Our objective is to 
validate SEU correction and investigate the accuracy of the 
double error detection circuitry. We are able to observe 
response by utilizing the error inject controls on the Xilinx 
SEU controller. We fxst inject single bit errors. All are 
corrected. When we inject double bit errors within one frame; 
all are detected and not corrected. Several variations of 
multiple bit injections are under investigation by varying the 
separation of bit addresses (thus varying error patterns within 
memory). We observe that all odd number injections are 
noted as corrected (SCAN-ERROR). However, this is an 
impossible event because the ECC implementation is 
SECDED (multiple bit errors can not be corrected). We also 
observe that 4 and 8 bit error injections go undetected. These 
results must be taken into account when analyzing MBU cross- 
sections while utilizing the Xilinx SEU controller. 
D. Internal Scrubber Integrity 
The Xilinx internal scrubber has 4 general methods of 
inoperability: 
1. MBU causing the SECDED to either: not be able to 
correct and therefore potential fault accumulation can 
occur (within a frame) or improperly correct a frame 
thus creating massive interconnect errors 
2 .  Internal scrubber circuitry gets hit and causes 
improper function or cease of function 
3. Utilized BRAM (pico-blaze of internal scrubber uses 
BRAM) gets hit and causes malfunction. 
4. ICAP interface becomes inoperable 
We investigate the affects of these potential faults on the 
generally operability of a selected Design Under Test. 
IV. NASNGSFC REAG EXTERNAL SCRUBBER 
A. General Descriptim 
Due to the observed MBU data cross-sections [3], and the 
inability of SECDED ECC to handle MBU occurrences, the 
NASNGSFC Radiation Effects and analysis group 
investigated alternative approaches to configuration memory 
mitigation. The external scrubber developed by NASAIGSFC 
does not use ECC circuitry in order to correct. Instead, a 
golden configuration is stored. An external device 
periodically overwrites the configuration memory through the 
Xilinx select map interface port with the golden information. 
In our case the external device is our tester. In a flight project, 
the external device would be a hardened FPGA. This is a 
scrubber therefore functionality is never disrupted unless a 
SEFI occurs. Because ECC is not used, performance is not 
limited by syndrome length and correction capability i.e. all 
errors within accessible configuration can be corrected in 
absence of a SEFI. 
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B. External Scrubber Integrity 
Concerning the Xilinx device alone, there is one general 
method of External Scrubber inoperability: Interface circuitry 
malfunction (includes associated registers, counters, state 
machines, etc.. .) 
V. DESIGN UNDER TEST 
The NASA-GSFC REAG group is responsible for testing 
many types of FPGA devices. In order to perform a direct 
comparison among FPGA error cross-sections, the windowed 
output shift register architecture was implemented as the 
Design Under Test (DUT) [7]. There were 3 types of shift 
registers each with 300 flip flops within the string (2 copies of 
each were implemented in the DUT): 
1. Only Flip-flops within the string 
2. Flip-flops with 8 inverters between each stage 
3. Flip-flops with 20 inverters between each stage 
Two categories of design architectures were implemented: 
1. Shift registers (plus associated combinatorial string 
logic - 0, 8, and 20 inverters), 
2. Shift registers (plus associated combinatorial string 
logic - 0, 8, and 20 inverters), including Internal 
Scrubber circuitry. 
All shift registers were run at 100 MHz and all 6 strings are 
contained in one FPGA device. 
VI. TEST RESULTS 
A. The Tester 
We constructed a daughter board for the LX25 Xilinx devices. 
The LX2.5 board connects to the NASAIGSFC Low Cost 
Digital Tester (LCDT) [ 5 ] .  The LCDT provides clock, data, 
and reset inputs to the DUT. The LCDT is also responsible 
for capturing the outputs from the DUT and reporting and 
errors to the user-Host computer (refer to figure 2). 
We obtained data at both the Texas A&M Cyclotron Institute 
(TAMU). Figure 3 illustrates Test Results from TAMU with 
24.8 MeVIU heavy ion beam (Argon) @ 0 degrees of 
incidence and L E T = ~ . ~ M ~ V * C ~ ~ / ~ ~  . The Mal-functional 
cross-section was calculated as functional inoperability over 
fluence. The readback error cross-section was determined 
after reading the configuration memory (number of bits in 
error) post irradiation runs over fluence. 
B. Malfunction Categorization 
Figure 3 illustrates two types of categories of errors: 
(2) Single Point: error occurring for one clock cycle of 
the DUT 
A category 1 malfunction occurs when a configuration bit gets 
hit. It can only be corrected upon reconfiguration or 
scrubbing. In this case, the external scrubber corrected the 
bit(s) and normal operation resumed after 20ms. A single 
point failure occurs when the internal logic portion of the 
FPGA reverses its state due to a radiation strike and the effect 
is stored within a flip-flop. The implemented function within 
the DUT allows all single point failures to be overwritten by 
the next clock cycle (no enables are utilized). This analysis 
affects design strategy such as mitigation, logic utilization, and 
time specifications and must be taken into account for flight 
missions. 
When the output of the DUT is stuck in a burst state, other 
potential errors will be masked. Due to the long duration of 
bursts, a true cross-section can not be accurately calculated by 
the traditional method of events divided by fluence. In this 
case we calculate time in burst per test and subtract an 
approximate number of particles that would affect the DUT 
during this period: 
" - 
TFL - (TB * Flux) 
NE: Number of Events 
TFL: Total Effective Fluence 
TB: Time in Burst 
Flux: Approximate reported particle flux (particles/second) 
It is important to note, that when we reduce the time in burst 
(configuration memory errors), the DUT approaches the 
behavior of an antifuse device (configuration is hardened). 
However, we do not eliminate the logic errors. They still exist 
and will be evident as illustrated by the single bit errors in the 
graph as in Figure 3. 
We are performing dynamic testing and are investigating 
malfunction @ 100MHz with obvservability of every DFF 
within the device. The probability of incurring a fault is 
dependent on both the configuration memory and on the 
device logic. While calculating an error cross section per bit, 
care must be taken because the probabilities of configuration 
memory and of DFFs (logic bits) are not the same. In 
addition, as the technology scales down, multiple bit errors 
become significant. Simply normalizing the error by total bit 
count does not take this phenomenon into account. Because of 
the potential discrepancy, we chose to calculate error cross- 
section per design malfunction. In this case, errors can only be 
masked by bursts and are not masked due to complex 
knctionality. The cross section can then be easily adjusted 
and normalized as demonstrated in section B. 
(1) Burst: Errors occurring for a long period of time 
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C. Cross Section Analysis 
Our error cross sections are considerably larger than most 
reported cross-sections for Xilinx Devices (figure 4). The 
following are 2 general explanations: 
The difference in performance (error cross-section) between 
the external vs. internal scrubbers was not as great as expected. 
We assume this is a result of running tests until uncorrectable 
states occur (SEFI). This cross-section does not reflect time to 
SEFI, it reflects malfunction during operational time. 
Accordingly, although the cross-sections did not have a large 
difference in value, the external scrubbing was always 
recoverable without the need for a reset or power cycle (for 
our DUT design), whereas the internal scrubbing was never 
recoverable - i.e. faults occurred that were uncorrectable. 
Time to SEFI cross sections will be calculated. We have seen 
a notable difference in performance between the external 
scrubber and the internal scrubber within the FX60 Power PC 
tests performed by our group[8]. More data is currently being 
analyzed. 
D. Resource Analysis 
The NASAIGSFC Scrubber had the best performance as 
expected (because it is not dependent on MBU). The external 
scrubber incurred zero resource errors at the end of each 
external run as illustrated in Figure 3.  The external scrubber 
wrote through BRAM for each test (the design did not use 
BRAM so this is a valid setting). 
It is interesting to note that the readback data from the internal 
scrubber consistently had a higher count of resource errors. 
We believe this is due to the fact that we performed readback 
post test. The tests were terminated if the device entered an 
uncorrectable state. At this point, the internal scrubber may 
have written bad data into the frame after miscalculations from 
the SECDED algorithm. 
Data is currently being analyzed from tests that contained 
intermediate readbacks during irradiation. This will enable the 
analysis to have a finer granularity of resource observation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have presented two Xilinx Device Configuration 
mitigation schemes (scrubbers) - one developed by Xilinx and 
one developed by NASAIGSFC. The Xilinx scrubber uses 
SECDED ECC to detect and correct errors. This scheme is 
inherently limited. We have observed the limitations during 
fault injection and monitoring false correction detection and 
absent error detection. The NASNGSFC scrubber uses a 
golden configuration map with no ECC circuitry. In 
accordance to the fact that the NASNGSFC scrubber has the 
ability to correct any number of errors it has been shown that 
the NASNGSFC has improved performance over the Xilinx 
Scrubber. 
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Due to the high error cross-section, and the device consistently 
reaching uncorrectable states, we conclude that it is beneficial 
for a flight mission to consider both category land category 2 
configuration mitigation strategies to enhance performance. 
To,be published in the 9th European Conference Radiation and Its Effects on Components and Systems (RADECS07), 5 
IEEE RADECS07 Proceedings, June 2008. 
Figure 1: Xilnx SEU Controller Block Diagrams [4]: The Right Most Block Diagram Illustrates 110 for the Core 
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Table 1:Xilinx LX25 Utilization Charts for 2 Implemented DUT Designs 
I Logic Utilization Used Available 1 Utilization 1 
xli4JimJJI 
SEU-cntlr.~ 
SEU-enflr.vhd 
RSTJCAP 
ICAP-CLK 
RUN-SCAN SCAN-ACTIVE 
SCAN-WE SCAN-ERROR 
ERRORINJECT SEU-DETECT 
l ~umber  of Slice Flip Flops 18291 2 15041 8%\ 
- 
- 
- 
Number of 4 input LUTs 16,6251 2 15041 77% 
Logic Utilization 
Number of Slice Flip Flops 
Number of 4 input LUTs 
Logic Distribution 
Used 
1829 
16,625 
107521 91 % 
Logic Distribution 
Number of occupied Slices 
Available 
21 504 
21 504 
984 1 
Utilization 
8% 
77% 
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Figure 2: NASAIGSFC REAG LCDT with LX25 DUT 
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Figure 3: LDCT Captured Data: Burst and Single Point Failures during External Scrubbing Mode 
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Error Cross-Section per Design Malfunction: 
Comparison of Scrubbing Techniques: 
LX25 Shift Registers @ 5.7 LET 
No Scrubbing 
I External Scrubber 
Internal Scrubbina 
Figure 4: External Scrubbing vs. Internal Scrubbing @ 0 Degrees Incidence 
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Figure 5: Comparison of Resources post-irradiation for No Scrubbing vs. Internal Scrubbing 
